
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26 June 1956

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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1. SINO-SOVIET SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION PARTY ANGERS BURMESE LEADERS

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Shock over the magnitude of Soviet and Chinese Communist assistance--especially Chinese--to the pro-Communist National United Front in the recent

elections adversely affected the attitude of many of Burma's leaders toward the Communist bloc, according to the American embassy in Rangoon. Premier Ba Swe was reported particularly angered.

Comment

Former premier Nu had earlier been reported as deeply disturbed over Soviet and Chinese interference in the elections. His feeling that Burma's policy of friendship and trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc was, at least in part, a mistake seems to be shared by Ba Swe and the other Burma Socialist Party leaders who now control the government.

Burma, while continuing its policy of noninvolvement in the East-West conflict, may become cooler in its relations with the bloc. There are already indications it will attempt a gradual disengagement from its now extensive barter trade with Communist countries, which has come under increasing official and popular criticism in Rangoon in recent weeks.

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2. AMBASSADOR BOHLEN COMMENTS ON TITO'S RELATIONS WITH THE USSR

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Commenting on President Tito's visit to the USSR, Ambassador Bohlen observes that in international affairs Yugoslavia has "rejoined the Communist com-

munity." Bohlen believes that unless the USSR changes its current line or overplays its hand, Yugoslavia will continue and even increase its support of Soviet foreign policy. He adds, however, that Tito has "rejoined" on his own terms, and as yet there is no indication that Yugoslavia has lost its independence.

Bohlen believes that the apparent Soviet acceptance of Yugoslav theories regarding relations among Communist countries and left-wing parties may stimulate changes in relations between Moscow and other Communist parties that logically should result in the termination of direct Soviet control. He warns, however, that the development of independent Communist states might not be an unalloyed advantage to the West since, as Tito's return to the Communist community reveals, their foreign policy aims would probably be the same as Moscow's.

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
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3. ICELANDIC ELECTION

Comment on:

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the NATO base at Keflavik. The alliance has gained at the expense of the Conservatives and a small nationalistic party which lost both its seats. The Communists and leftwing Socialists increased their popular vote but did not gain seats in addition to the seven they won in 1953.

Even if the Progressive-Social Democratic alliance fails to attain an absolute parliamentary majority, its strong showing may encourage it to form a minority government. Such a government would receive Communist support on issues arising from the base negotiations.

Any new government emerging from the elections is already committed to negotiate a revision of the 1951 defense agreement with the United States in talks beginning 1 August. The gains made by the Progressive Party in its alliance with the Social Democrats are likely to strengthen the position of those elements favoring a drastic revision of the agreement.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION (Information as of 1700, 25 June)

Nothing of significance to report.

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